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Abstract
In this article, we aim to disentangle the extent towhich citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped by
populist attitudes or rather by radical left and right host ideologies. Following recent work by Landwehr and Steiner (2017),
we distinguish four modes of decision-making embedded in different conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy,
anti-pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarianism. Drawing on data from Austria and Germany, we show
that populism and radical host ideologies tap into different dimensions of democracy. While populism is primarily directed
against representative forms of democratic decision-making, preferences for deliberative procedures and majority deci-
sions appear entirely shaped by radical left and right host ideologies. Populism thus views decision-making based on the
general will of the people as the only legitimate democratic procedure, whereas radical left and right host ideologies aim
at involving the relevant group(s) of citizens. Further analyses of the interactions between populist attitudes and radical
host ideologies confirm that the effects of populism remain robust and thus independent of the specific manifestations of
radical host ideologies. These findings help to disentangle the causes of democratic discontent and to develop possible re-
sponses through democratic reforms that specifically and separately aim to mitigate populism and radical host ideologies.
Keywords
Austria; democratic decision-making; democracy; Germany; host ideology; populism; populist attitudes
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Populism and Polarization: A Dual Threat to Europe’s Liberal Democracies?” edited by Jonas
Linde (University of Bergen, Norway), Marlene Mauk (GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany) and Heidi
Schulze (GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Germany).
© 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The conceptions of democracy underlying the ideology
of radical populist parties arguably pose a threat to both
liberal and representative democracy (Galston, 2018;
Pappas, 2019; Plattner, 2010; Taggart, 2004; Urbinati,
1998). Yet, we know little about how the attitudes per-
taining to the populist core on the one hand and those
based on radical left or right host ideologies on the other
relate to normative conceptions and expectations about
democratic decision-making. Following an ideational ap-
proach (Hawkins, Carlin, Littvay, & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), we view pop-
ulism as directed against the liberal principles of democ-
racy such as minority rights and the rule of law, while fa-
voring direct popular participation rather than decision-
making by elected representatives. Radical left and right
host ideologies, by contrast, define manifestations of so-
cial grievances in society, assign blame to those they la-
bel responsible, and propose different solutions in the
form of radical change in favor of those who ought to
govern in the place of corrupt politicians.
The challenge is that populism rarely occurs alone,
but often in tandem with a radical left or right host ide-
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ology. This entanglement has given rise to a consider-
able debate on the precise locus of the effect. Specifically,
whether effects can be independently ascribed and thus
measured, or whether they are inherently intertwined,
even to the point that populism per se is an empty shell.
Proceeding from the idea that populism has a substan-
tial core and is meaningfully distinct from the influence
of host ideologies, our analysis will need to show that the
effects are independently present in the dependent vari-
ables. In this article, we therefore aim to disentangle this
relationship by examining the extent to which citizens’
conceptions of democratic decision-making are shaped
by populist attitudes or rather by attitudes towards rad-
ical left and right host ideologies. Accordingly, we ask to
what extent populist attitudes and attitudes based on
radical left and right host ideologies affect citizens’ con-
ceptions of democratic decision-making.
Drawing on recent research by Landwehr and Steiner
(2017) on the gap between democratic aspirations
and democratic practice, we distinguish four modes
of democratic decision-making embedded in different
conceptions of democracy: trusteeship democracy, anti-
pluralism, deliberative proceduralism, and majoritarian-
ism. Using data from the GESIS Panel (Bosnjak et al.,
2018; GESIS, 2019) for Germany and the Austrian
National Election Study (AUTNES) Online Panel (Wagner
et al., 2018), we focus on the distinction between pop-
ulism and radical host ideologies and their impact on citi-
zens’ understanding of the functional and procedural as-
pects of democracy.
Our article proceeds by first laying out our theoretical
argument and discussing the relationship between pop-
ulism and radical host ideologies as related to different
conceptions of democratic decision-making. After stat-
ing our hypotheses, we present the research design and
briefly introduce our two cases, Austria and Germany.
This is followed by the empirical analysis and the discus-
sion of our findings.
2. Theoretical Argument
2.1. Citizens’ Conceptions of Democratic
Decision-Making
In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on cit-
izens’ preferences for democracy and specific decision-
making procedures (Bengtsson, 2012; Bengtsson &
Mattila, 2009; Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007; Font,
Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
2001). Overall, research has shown that certain atti-
tudes towards the democratic decision-making process
affect citizens’ participation in politics (Bengtsson &
Christensen, 2016; Gherghina & Geissel, 2017; Neblo,
Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey, 2010; Webb, 2013).
Moreover, citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-
making constitute the individual yardstick for evaluating
the functioning of democracy in practice (Landwehr &
Steiner, 2017). Democratic discontent is thus also rooted
in how citizens define democracy and their expectations
of the way democratic decisions should be taken.
In turn, democratic discontent, alongside ideologi-
cal attitudes and policy preferences, is an important
explanation for the success of radical populist par-
ties over time and across countries (Hernández, 2018;
Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Rooduijn, 2018;
Schumacher & Rooduijn, 2013). Apart from these pre-
sumed indirect effects, recent studies show that certain
notions of democracy are also directly related to the sup-
port for populist (radical right) parties (Schmitt-Beck, van
Deth, & Staudt, 2017; Steiner & Landwehr, 2018). In or-
der to explain the success of radical populist parties, it is
therefore essential to disentangle the relationships be-
tween populism, radical host ideologies and different
conceptions of democratic decision-making.
Following previous research by Landwehr and Steiner
(2017), we distinguish between a core concept of democ-
racy as a first layer and conceptions of democratic
decision-making as a second layer. While the first layer
refers to the essential guidelines and regime principles
of democracy, the second layer deals with the norms and
procedures of howdemocratic decisions should bemade
(Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1965). Since populist citizens—
those holding populist attitudes—support democracy
over other forms of government, while being dissatis-
fied with the way democracy works in practice (Rovira
Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert, 2020; Vehrkamp & Wratil,
2017), we assume that this dissatisfaction is not per se
the result of a general rejection of democratic princi-
ples but based on specific normative expectations of the
democratic decision-making process.
In accordance with Landwehr and Steiner (2017),
we distinguish four modes of democratic decision-
making embedded in different conceptions of democ-
racy: trusteeship democracy, anti-pluralism, deliberative
proceduralism, and majoritarianism. These conceptions
broadly represent four distinct ideas about how democ-
racy should be constituted normatively and functionally,
and which are crucial to the current debate about demo-
cratic development. Trusteeship democracy refers to the
common type of representative democracy in which leg-
islators act as trustees of their voters. While this mode
of decision-making requires trust on the part of the
voter that the representative has the best interest of
the citizens in mind, it also entails searching for compro-
mises away from the spotlight and public opinion. The
anti-pluralistmode views conflict between different par-
ticularistic interests as detrimental to the generalwelfare
of the people. Accordingly, important political decisions
are rather to be left to experts. Deliberative procedural-
ismhere refers to decision-making throughprocedures in
which the concern for general welfare outweighs individ-
ual and particularistic interests. The mode of majoritari-
anism is based on the idea that the government should
respond primarily to a commonwill of the (relevant) peo-
ple. Incorporatingminorities and diverse views is seen as
tantamount to thwarting the will of the people.
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2.2. How Populism Relates to Democratic
Decision-Making
Following an ideational approach (Hawkins et al., 2018;
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), we define populism
as a thin-centered “ideology that considers society to
be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and an-
tagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an ex-
pression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people” (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). On the part of vot-
ers, populism exists as a set of widespread attitudes
among ordinary citizens that lie dormant until acti-
vated by weak democratic governance and policy failure.
These attitudes are centered on the three constituent
ideational elements of anti-elitism, people-centrism, and
a Manichean worldview (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove,
2014; Castanho Silva, Jungkunz, Helbling, & Littvay, 2019;
Rooduijn, 2014).
The ambivalent nature of the relationship between
populism and democracy remains essentially controver-
sial and has been the subject of claims and counter-
claims. Some scholars suggest that populists may force
incumbent traditional parties to become more atten-
tive, thereby mitigating a growing crisis of representa-
tion (Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2002; Taggart, 2002), but have
otherwise little measurable negative impact on the po-
litical system (Canovan, 1999; Heinisch, 2003; Mény &
Surel, 2002; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2014). Others have pushed back against
this perspective by arguing that while populism is not
anti-democratic per se, its antagonism to the procedu-
ral aspects of liberal representative democracy is well-
established (Galston, 2018; Heinisch & Wegscheider,
2019; Huber & Schimpf, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Pappas,
2019; Plattner, 2010; Taggart, 2004; Urbinati, 1998).
This is because the people are seen as the “ultimate
source of legitimacy” (van Kessel, 2015, p. 15) for democ-
racy and, thus, the popular will is above criticism and
beyond institutional constraints. Accordingly, radical pop-
ulists in advancedWestern European democracies regard
the people as betrayed not simply by the personal corrup-
tion of elites but by systematic programmatic misrepre-
sentation (Mudde, 2004). As a consequence, populists fre-
quently call for the direct implementation of the people’s
will through plebiscitary measures (Abts & Rummens,
2007; Barr, 2009; Canovan, 2002). Likewise, political divi-
sions are not seen as legitimate differences of interest but
rather the result of outsider meddling. As a result, com-
promises designed to resolve such differences are often
regarded as less than fully legitimate (Schedler, 1996). By
rejecting the idea of a plurality of positions and interests
and by presenting political decision-making in the form
of stark moral choices between good and evil (Mudde,
2004; Plattner, 2010), democratic decisions are framed
as between those for and against the people. Such a bi-
nary moral framework may intensify already bifurcated
attitudes towards how democratic procedures work.
Procedurally speaking, populism assigns a central
role to the people in decision-making, thus support-
ing participatory approaches to democracy in the form
of plebiscites (Mohrenberg, Huber, & Freyburg, 2019).
Populists also prefer a passive role in politics (stealth
democracy), assuming that the government is respon-
sive and implements policies according to their interests
(Stoker & Hay, 2017). This, in turn, makes deliberation
in politics seemingly superfluous in populists’ eyes as
long as political outcomes are in line with the general
will (Urbinati, 2019). On a more general level, populists
are likely to oppose representative democracy, charac-
terized by a plurality of preferences, mediation, and com-
promises and thus political decision-makers acting as
trustees on behalf of diverse citizens interests (Taggart,
2000, 2004). Nonetheless, populists may prefer experts
to policy-makers because the former are less likely to be
regarded as self-serving (Mohrenberg et al., 2019).
Based on our discussion of the relationship be-
tween democracy and populism, we assume the follow-
ing effects of populist attitudes on democratic decision-
making: We expect to see attitudes that elites and rep-
resentatives are untrustworthy and resented for making
all the important decisions, while ordinary people are
seen as being ignored and powerless. Decision-making
processes are likely regarded as opaque and potentially
corrupt so that the compromises achieved are not rep-
resentative of the genuine popular will. In short, follow-
ing the populist core framework, the procedural dimen-
sion of current liberal representative democracy is likely
to be viewed negatively because the decision-makers are
self-serving; the people for whom the decisions are to be
made are not adequately represented; and the process
of reaching a decision is tainted. In the following, we pro-
vide specific explanations for our hypotheses and show
how the above discussion applies.
The first hypothesis posits that the very anti-elitism
and people-centrism inherent in populism will cause
such citizens to be skeptical towards elected politicians
and, thus, evaluate the principles of representation neg-
atively. As a result, we state it as follows:
HPOP1: The higher citizens’ populist attitudes, the less
they support trusteeship democracy.
The next hypothesis concerns the populist notion of
the people as being unified and homogeneous. This
runs counter to pluralism, which implies diversity of
opinion, thus bestowing legitimacy to non-majoritarian
viewpoints. In consequence, populism perceives such
decision-making modes as illegitimate or a threat.
Therefore, we specify the following hypothesis:
HPOP2: The higher citizens’ populist attitudes, the
more they support anti-pluralism.
When it comes to populist attitudes and support for de-
liberative democracy, we theorize that populists will see
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little need for such a process if governments enact the
popular will. Any mediation beyond that would, in their
view, only invite illegitimate extraneous influences into
the mix. However, if the original decision had not come
about based on the popular will, then, accordingly, no de-
liberative mechanisms would restore legitimacy. Hence,
we state the hypothesis as follows:
HPOP3: The higher citizens’ populist attitudes, the less
they support deliberative proceduralism.
Concerning the relationship between populism and ma-
joritarianism, we note that the central idea in populism
is that legitimate decisions derive from the unmediated
majority opinion of the people as they are the source of
political power. Thus, our hypothesis reads as follows:
HPOP4: The higher citizens’ populist attitudes, the
more they support majoritarianism.
2.3. How Radical Host Ideologies Relate to Democratic
Decision-Making
In this section, we lay out our argument for how radical
host ideologies affect the four conceptions of democratic
decision-making and proceed from the assumption that
populism is a thin ideology and thus attached to differ-
ent radical host ideologies (Stanley, 2008; Taggart, 2000).
In keeping with the ideational approach and mindful of
arguments to the contrary, we conceive populism as hav-
ing a substantive core of its own with distinct influences,
independent of the radical right or left host ideologywith
which populism is associated. In trying to determine the
extent to which the effect on attitudes towards demo-
cratic decision-making is based on the radical host ide-
ology, we first need to establish its plausible connection
with the respective proceduralmodes. Only then, in a fur-
ther step, wewill be able to see whether the interactions
betweenhost ideologies andpopulismmanifest any com-
bined effects. Thus, our subsequent discussion specifies
the causal connection between the dependent variables
and radical host ideologies independent of populism.
The radical right ideology is based on the characteris-
tics of nativism and right-wing authoritarianism (Mudde,
2007). The ideological core of the radical right is a com-
bination of an exclusive nationalism and xenophobia
(Rydgren, 2007, 2018). This nativist worldview “holds
that states should be inhabited exclusively by mem-
bers of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-
native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally
threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde,
2007, p. 19). The second characteristic of the radical
right ideology is right-wing authoritarianism and encom-
passes the characteristics of authoritarian submission,
authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer,
1981). Right-wing authoritarianism is the belief in a
strictly ordered hierarchical society demanding submis-
sion to authority and social conventions (Mudde, 2007;
Rydgren, 2018) and is due to an “uncritical, respectful,
obedient support for existing societal authorities and in-
stitutions” (Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013, p. 843).
Drawing on these two components of the radical
right ideology, we formulate our hypotheses regarding
the relationship to the four conceptions of democratic
decision-making, albeit following a different causal infer-
ence. In the case of the radical right, the cause is not anti-
elitism and the general will but rather a specific concern
about compromises with and the influence of (a) those
who are ethnically not part of the autochthonous peo-
ple (nativism) and (b) those subverting existing authority
structures (right-wing authoritarianism). Although these
hypotheses are pointing in the same direction as those
stated above, we expect the relative effects to be differ-
ent. The subsequent segment provides specific explana-
tions for our hypotheses and shows how our above dis-
cussion applies.
The first hypothesis is based on the argument that
as long as representation cannot be effectively restricted
to the acceptable autochthonous populations, political
trusteeship remains unacceptable to radical right cit-
izens because it would potentially lead to outcomes
that reflect the political input of socio-cultural others.
Incidentally, this is different from populists whose insis-
tence on anti-elitism and people-centeredness calls the
principle of representation itself into question. Nativists,
by contrast, should have no objection in principle to be-
ing represented by other nativists. Additionally, obedi-
ence and submission to societal authorities and conven-
tions inherent in right-wing authoritarianism might lead
to a positive evaluation of institutionalized hierarchies
of representation. While this relationship is ambiguous
and far from clear, given the aversion of the radical right
towards politicians acting as trustees of socio-cultural
others, we assume a negative relationship between rad-
ical right attitudes and representative decision-making.
Thus, we state the hypothesis as follows:
HRR1: The higher citizens’ radical right attitudes, the
less they support trusteeship democracy.
As in the previous case, any form of pluralism entails rec-
ognizing the legitimate interests of socio-cultural others,
which nativists would have to reject if theywanted to see
their own interests prevail. Given the ideological oppo-
sition between radical right positions and pluralism, we
formulate our hypothesis as follows:
HRR2: The higher citizens’ radical right attitudes, the
more they support anti-pluralism.
We also expect radical right attitudes to have a negative
effect on supporting deliberative proceduralism because
a feature of the radical right ideology is the belief in ver-
tical authority. Once a legitimate and acceptable leader
is selected, it is unlikely that there would be support for
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a grassroots process designed to undermine or upend
the authority of that leader. Hence, our hypothesis reads
as follows:
HRR3: The higher citizens’ radical right attitudes, the
less they support deliberative proceduralism.
Given that autochthonous populations form a major-
ity in most democracies, majoritarian processes dilute
the resented influence of socio-cultural or socio-political
minorities. Thus, nativists are expected to support ma-
joritarianism. Here it is less the principle of people-
centeredness but rather the potential to preserve the
substantive nativist agenda that matters. We state our
hypothesis as follows:
HRR4: The higher citizens’ radical right attitudes, the
more they support majoritarianism.
While the radical right focuses on an authoritarian and
nativist stance, the radical left mobilizes mainly based
on socio-economic grievances and offers leftist policy
solutions (March, 2017). The radical left ideology is fo-
cused on the exploitation of societies due to the “socio-
economic structure of contemporary capitalism” (March
& Mudde, 2005, p. 25) and thus rejects its values and
practices. Radical left parties promote alternative redis-
tribution policies and a strong role of the state in the
economy to combat social and economic inequalities
(March, 2007, 2011). Alongside these economic posi-
tions, radical left parties often represent ‘new left’ is-
sues such as gender equality, gay rights and other egali-
tarian policies (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017; Stavrakakis
& Katsambekis, 2014). As such, we expect different ef-
fects on democratic decision-making modes. In particu-
lar, we assume it to be more favorably disposed towards
pluralism and deliberative procedures, as these promise
greater social inclusion. At the same time, we would
expect greater skepticism towards trusteeship democ-
racy, because it appears more open to behind-scenes
lobbying, which tends to favor economic interests. In
the following, we specify our hypotheses and provide
brief explanations:
Trusteeship democracy allows for a selective and
opaque access to political decision-makers. Accordingly,
the asymmetrical resource distribution between eco-
nomic interest groups places lobbies representing capital
and business at an advantage causing radical left citizens
to be skeptical. Hence, our hypothesis reads as follows:
HRL1: The higher citizens’ radical left attitudes, the
less they support trusteeship democracy.
When it comes to anti-pluralism, we assume that radical
left citizens not only represent diverse interests whose
input matters to them but they are also conscious of
the greater capacity of business interests to shape pub-
lic opinion and thus, in their eyes, manufacture majori-
ties. Pluralism provides for a way to mitigate this disad-
vantage and thus we hypothesize:
HRL2: The higher citizens’ radical left attitudes, the
less they support anti-pluralism.
To the extent that leftist populists viewmajor political de-
cisions to reflect the interests of the economically power-
ful, a deliberative procedure is seen as another opportu-
nity to increase citizen input and thus viewed favorably.
Accordingly, we state our hypothesis as follows:
HRL3: The higher citizens’ radical left attitudes, the
more they support deliberative proceduralism.
As the radical left tends to represent minority interests,
wewould expect such citizens to oppose procedures that
preclude them from exercising influence. As also shown
in the summary of hypotheses in Table 1, we state this
hypothesis as follows:
HRL4: The higher citizens’ radical left attitudes, the
less they support majoritarianism.
3. Research Design
3.1. Data and Case Selection
We test our hypotheses using survey data from the GESIS
Panel (Bosnjak et al., 2018; GESIS, 2019) for Germany
and the AUTNES Online Panel (Wagner et al., 2018). Both
data are representative samples of the respective popu-
lation and contain the same questions on citizens’ con-
ceptions of democratic decision-making. Moreover, the
panel structure of the data enables us to impute missing
values of respondents for certain variables from other
waves of the data. We normalize all variables within a
range from 0 to 1.0 to allow for the comparison of coef-
ficients and simplify the interpretation of our analyses.
Tables A1 and A2 in the Supplementary File provide fur-
ther information on all variables used in our analyses.
Table 1. Summary of hypotheses.
Variable Trusteeship democracy Anti-pluralism Deliberative proceduralism Majoritarianism
Populist attitudes − + − +
Radical right host ideology − + − +
Radical left host ideology − − + −
Notes: The minus sign (−) indicates an expected negative relationship and the plus sign (+) an expected positive relationship.
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Austria and Germany are particularly well suited for
comparison to test our hypotheses. A closely related
historical legacy as well as similar economic, cultural,
and political conditions allow us to keep many factors
constant. Yet, based on the approach of institutional
socialization, we expect varying perceptions of democ-
racy among citizens from Austria and Germany. These
two countries differ in the reappraisal of their National
Socialist past and the constitutional definition of democ-
racy. Germany has put in place an explicit commitment
to liberal representative democracy as a reaction to its
Fascist legacy and is thus a vigorous defender of con-
stitutionalism. Austria, by contrast, has continued an
old constitutional approach that separates the norma-
tive and political dimension from the procedural, which
appears in the constitution as little more than rules
of implementation.
Moreover, both countries differ in their post-war ex-
perience with radical populist parties in national parlia-
ments. The fact that political parties have significant in-
fluence on the articulation and occupation of political is-
sues for the public makes differences between Austria
and Germany most likely. While the Austrian Freedom
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/FPÖ), a highly suc-
cessful and prototypical populist radical right party, has
been in the Austrian parliament since 1956, the cor-
responding populist radical right party Alternative for
Germany (Alternative für Deutschland/AfD) entered the
German parliament only in 2017. Furthermore, these
two populist radical right parties differ in their politi-
cal positions. Recent work on the ideological differences
has shown the AfD to be far more radical right (also in
socio-economic terms) than the FPÖ, which has moder-
ated somewhat and moved more to the left on social
and economic issues (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; Heinisch
& Werner, 2019; Rovny, 2013). A distinctive feature of
the German case is the presence of a relevant populist
radical left party, The Left (Die Linke), which has been
gradually branching out from its electoral strongholds in
Eastern Germany to the rest of the country. As a result
of these different experiences with radical populist par-
ties, we also expect differences in the prevalence of pop-
ulist attitudes and radical left and right host ideologies
among Austrian and German citizens. Thus, this case se-
lection and the largely parallel data provide us with con-
fidence as to the robustness and context sensitivity of
the findings.
3.2. Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables measure citizens’ conceptions
of democratic decision-making. Following the analysis
of Landwehr and Steiner (2017), we distinguish be-
tween the four normative conceptions of democratic
decision-making outlined above. The original data of the
GESIS Panel comprise 18 items on the procedures of
democratic decision-making. In the AUTNESOnline Panel
Study, however, we included only the two variables of
each conception of democratic decision-making with the
highest factor loadings as analyzed by Landwehr and
Steiner (2017, p. 792). Respondents were thus asked to
rate eight normative statements on procedures of demo-
cratic decision-making on a Likert scale ranging from com-
pletely disagree (0) to completely agree (1.0). As shown
in Tables B1 and B2 in the Supplementary File, we can
confirm the conceptions of democratic decision-making
identified by Landwehr and Steiner (2017) with principal-
component factor analyses. Accordingly, we calculate an
additive index for each of the four conceptions of demo-
cratic decision-making by adding the values of the two
respective variables together. High values on the index
of (1) trusteeship democracy mean high levels of trust
and support in the mode of representative democracy,
while high values on the index of (2) anti-pluralism indi-
cate support for the idea of an anti-particularistic soci-
ety and acceptance of technocratic ideas of democratic
decision-making. High values on the index of (3) delibera-
tive proceduralismmean a high acceptance of democrati-
cally made decisions and the prioritization of political de-
cisions that follow the common good. Lastly, high values
on the index of (4) majoritarianism indicate support for
majority decisions even if they restrict minority rights.
3.3. Independent Variables
Our main independent variables are populist attitudes
and attitudes towards the radical left and right host ide-
ologies. We measure populist attitudes with an additive
index by using a battery of six Likert items, which focus
on anti-elitism and popular sovereignty as core concepts
of populism (Hobolt, Anduiza, Carkoglu, Lutz, & Sauger,
2016). Castanho Silva et al. (2019) conclude in their
empirical comparison of populist attitudes scales that
this scale fails “to capture more than mere anti-elitism”
(Castanho Silva et al., 2019, p. 10) and thus does not fully
cover the dimensions of the ideational approach to pop-
ulism (Hawkins et al., 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2017). While we acknowledge this criticism and the re-
sulting limitations in the interpretation of our results, we
argue that this scale also captures support for popular
sovereignty (Wuttke, Schimpf, & Schoen, 2020), and we
thus believe that, given the limited data available, this
scale is at least a defensible approximation to the target
concept. High values on this index indicate high populist
attitudes (see Table B3 in the Supplementary File).
To measure attitudes towards the radical right host
ideology, we use anti-immigration attitudes, as a proxy
for nativism, and right-wing authoritarianism. To mea-
sure right-wing authoritarianism, we calculate an addi-
tive index of five Likert items in Austria (see Table B4
in the Supplementary File) and nine Likert items in
Germany (see Table B5 in the Supplementary File), which
refer to the three core characteristics of authoritarian
submission, authoritarian aggression and conventional-
ism (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt & Bizumic, 2013). High
values mean a high degree of right-wing authoritarian-
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ism.Wemeasure anti-immigration attitudes using an ad-
ditive index of four Likert items, which capture the re-
jection of immigrants as a threat to national customs,
culture, the economy, and crime (see Table B6 in the
Supplementary File). High values indicate a high level of
anti-immigration attitudes.
Tomeasure attitudes towards the radical left host ide-
ology, we use preferences for left-wing economic poli-
cies. Due to data limitations, we cannot include other im-
portant radical left economic attitudes, such as the rejec-
tion of capitalism and globalization, as well as cultural at-
titudes towards ‘new left’ issues such as gender equality,
gay rights and other egalitarian positions. We measure
preferences for left-wing economic policies by calculating
an additive index using four Likert items (see Table B7
in the Supplementary File) representing support for re-
distribution, higher state expenditures, combating social
and income inequalities, as well as increased state inter-
vention in the economy and labor market. High values
mean high support for left-wing economic policies.
3.4. Control Variables
As an additional control variable for political ideology,
we use the (squared) self-placement on the left-right
scale. We further control in all models for political in-
terest as well as for the socio-demographic character-
istics of income, education, gender, and age. Due to
space constraints, we provide further details on the op-
erationalization in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2 in
the Supplementary File). After excluding observations
with missing values, our final samples include 1,380 re-
spondents from Austria and 1,807 respondents from
Germany. We provide further information such as de-
scriptive statistics (Table A3) and distributions of the de-
pendent (Figures A1 and A2) and independent variables
(Figures A3, A4, A5 and A6) in the Supplementary File.
3.5. Estimation Strategy
As explained in detail in our theoretical argument, we
assume that populism and radical host ideologies exert
independent effects and constitute separate concepts if
the effects caused by populist attitudes remain robust
and constant after introducing interactions. Therefore,
we apply a two-step approach to investigate whether
and to what extent the effects of populist attitudes on
citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making are
independent of the effects of radical left and right host
ideologies. In a first step, we analyze the independent ef-
fects of populist attitudes and those associated with the
radical left and right host ideology on the four concep-
tions of democratic decision-making. In a second step,
we include interactions between populist attitudes and
the two characteristics of the radical right host ideology
(right-wing authoritarianism and anti-immigration atti-
tudes) as well as preferences for left-wing economic poli-
cies as a proxy for the radical left host ideology. We thus
use the second step of the analyses as an additional ro-
bustness test for the independence of the effects of pop-
ulist attitudes.
4. Empirical Results
Figure 1 shows the independent effects of populist atti-
tudes, right-wing authoritarianism, anti-immigration at-
titudes and preferences for left-wing economic policies
on the four conceptions of democratic decision-making
for Austria andGermany. Given thatwe normalize all vari-
ables within a range from0 to 1.0, the unstandardized co-
efficients can be interpreted as the maximum shift in the
dependent variable due to the change by the indepen-
dent variable from its minimum to its maximum value. In
other words, the unstandardized coefficients show the
maximum effect of the independent variable on the de-
pendent variable.
The results of our regression analyses confirm that
populist attitudes are negatively related with trustee-
ship democracy (HPOP1) in both Austria and Germany.
The anti-elite orientation inherent in populism leads,
as predicted, to a high degree of skepticism among
respondents towards elected representatives acting as
trustees of their citizens. Thus, our results show that
populism’s emphasis on the people as the only legiti-
mate political power contradicts representative decision-
making without considering the (relevant) public opin-
ion. We also note that populist attitudes have by far the
strongest effect compared to all other predictors. Thus,
a person with high populist attitudes scores about 0.3
to 0.4 points lower in support for trusteeship democ-
racy, which is a remarkably strong effect. Contrary to
our expectations, neither attitudes of the radical right
(HRR1) nor the radical left host ideology (HRL1) are sys-
tematically associated with higher opposition to repre-
sentative modes of decision-making. Rather, we find par-
tial evidence that right-wing authoritarianism is associ-
ated with higher trust in decision-making by representa-
tives, arguably due to obedience to societal authorities
and institutions.
The results also confirm our hypothesis that pop-
ulist attitudes are positively related with anti-pluralism
(HPOP2). Populism’s understanding of the people as ho-
mogeneous and unified thus leads to the rejection of
political debates with particularistic opinions. The pop-
ulist division of society into good and evil and the exclu-
sion of pluralistic diversity of opinion also refers to par-
liamentary decision-making by elected politicians, which
is better left to independent experts. Again, populist at-
titudes exert the comparatively strongest effect also on
this conception of democratic decision-making. A person
with high populist attitudes thus supports anti-pluralism
by about 0.4 points more than does a non-populist. In
line with our expectations, we also find partial evidence
that the radical right host ideology tends to favor anti-
pluralistic decision-making (HRR2). While the effects of
anti-immigration attitudes are almost zero, higher right-
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Figure 1. Explaining citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making. Notes: Plot shows unstandardized coefficients
with 95% confidence intervals and robust standard errors from linear regression models. Full models are reported in
Table C1 in the Supplementary File.
wing authoritarianism tends to be associatedwith higher
anti-pluralism. Based on these results, however, we can-
not draw any definitive conclusions regarding the as-
sociation of the radical right host ideology with anti-
pluralism. Regarding the radical left host ideology, we
find no systematic negative relationship between the
preferences for left-wing economic policies and anti-
pluralism (HRL2).
While populism is significantly linked to the rejection
of representative modes of democratic decision-making,
we find, against our expectations, no significant effects of
populist attitudes on deliberative proceduralism (HPOP3)
and majoritarianism (HPOP4). According to our findings,
populism is associated neither with a systematic rejec-
tion of political decisions reached through deliberation,
nor with support for the enforcement of majority deci-
sions that curtail minority rights. Rather, the preferences
for these conceptions of democratic decision-making
appear entirely shaped by the radical left and radical
right ideology.
While we find no significant effects regarding atti-
tudes pertaining to the radical right host ideology (HRR3),
preferences for left-wing economic policies are systemat-
ically linked with higher support for democratic decision-
making through deliberative procedures (HRL3). This re-
lationship can be explained by the fact that both left-
wing economic policies and deliberative procedures aim
to increase the inclusion and participation of underprivi-
leged classes and citizens. However, we also have to note
that the effect sizes of all independent variables explain-
ing deliberative proceduralism are comparatively small.
Thus, a person with strong preferences for left-wing eco-
nomic policies supports deliberative proceduralism only
between 0.05 and 0.1 points more.
In contrast, radical left and right host ideologiesmake
a clear difference onwhether someone is morewilling to
favor or reject majoritarianism and thus minority rights.
While citizens who advocate left-wing economic policies
are less inclined to supportmajoritarianism (HRL4), those
who perceive immigrants as a threat and have an au-
thoritarian personality aremore in favor of majority deci-
sions that also curtail minority rights (HRR4). Accordingly,
the inclusion or exclusion of minorities is the most sig-
nificant difference between the radical left and radical
right host ideology. In fact, among all dependent vari-
ables, majoritarianism is the dimension of democratic
decision-making most shaped by differences between
radical host ideologies, which is also reflected in the ef-
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fect sizes. While a person with strong radical right at-
titudes supports majoritarianism between 0.2 and 0.3
points more, persons with high radical left attitudes sup-
port majoritarianism by about 0.2 points less.
After analyzing the independent effects, we examine
whether and to what extent the effects of populist atti-
tudes remain robust when combined with a radical host
ideology. We follow the idea that if populism does in-
deed have its own substantive core, the effects should
remain constant regardless of the interaction with a rad-
ical host ideology. If, in turn, the effect of populist atti-
tudes depends on the strength of nativist or authoritar-
ian attitudes on the one hand, or preferences for left-
wing economic policies on the other, populism is indeed
highly dependent on its linkage with the radical host ide-
ologies. We therefore use the interactions as a further
robustness test to verify that the effects of populism are
independent of the radical host ideology with which pop-
ulism is connected, and that they thus constitute sepa-
rate concepts.
Figure 2 shows the effects of populist attitudes as
well as the interaction effects of populist attitudes de-
pending on the attitudes belonging to radical host ide-
ologies on the four conceptions of democratic decision-
making. Overall, our findings do not indicate a clear
and systematic pattern of interaction, suggesting primar-
ily that populism and attitudes pertaining to the radi-
cal right and left host ideologies exert independent ef-
fects on the support for the different decision-making
modes. Only five out of 24 interactions are (slightly) sig-
nificant, none of them highly significant or systematic
for both countries. The few significant interactions show
no substantial changes in the effects of populist atti-
tudes. Despite the inclusion of these additional interac-
tions, most of the main effects of our independent vari-
ables remain robust under various model specifications.
Most importantly, the effects of populist attitudes re-
main constant, which again suggests that populism fol-
lows its own logic regardless of its combination with a
radical host ideology.
In order to check the robustness of our results,
we have carried out further analyses. While we esti-
mated all interactions in these models simultaneously,
we also recalculated all interactions separately. The
results for the separate interactions with right-wing
authoritarianism (Table C3), anti-immigration attitudes
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Figure 2. Explaining citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making (including all interactions simultaneously). Notes:
Plot shows unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals and robust standard errors from linear regression
models. Full models are reported in Table C2 in the Supplementary File.
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(Table C4), and preferences for left-wing economic poli-
cies (Table C5) are shown in the Supplementary File.
As a further robustness test, we also performed interac-
tions between populist attitudes and the (squared) self-
placement on the left right scale, as shown in Table C6
in the Supplementary File. Due to similarities between
one of the populist attitudes items (“The people, not
the politicians, should make the most important political
decisions”) and one of the items measuring the depen-
dent variable of trusteeship democracy (“Sometimes it
is better when complex political decisions are taken by
politicians rather than citizens”) for the Austrian data, we
recalculated all models with the dependent variable of
trusteeship democracy without the corresponding pop-
ulism item. The analyses are presented in Table C7 in the
Supplementary File. For all these additional robustness
tests, results remain substantially the same. Together
with the fact that the results for both countries are
very similar despite the differences between Austria and
Germany mentioned above, this underscores the robust-
ness of our results.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we examined whether citizens’ concep-
tions of democratic decision-making are shaped by pop-
ulism or attitudes based on the radical right and left
host ideologies. Our results show that populism is primar-
ily directed against representative forms of democratic
decision-making that supposedly disregard the general
will of the people. This is accompanied by a preference
for independent experts over elected politicians and the
rejection of pluralistic political interests and positions in
society and politics. In turn, we find no effect of populism
on deliberative decision-making procedures and pref-
erences for majority decisions that disregard minority
rights. Rather, these conceptions of democratic decision-
making appear entirely shaped by the radical left and
right host ideologies. While citizens with radical left atti-
tudes are less inclined to support majoritarianism, those
with radical right attitudes are more in favor of majority
decisions that restrictminority rights. This highlights that,
from the perspective of radical host ideologies, demo-
cratic decision-making is primarily aimed at involving the
relevant group(s) of citizens.
Furthermore, our results show evidence that the ef-
fect of populism on conceptions of democratic decision-
making is independent of specific radical left and right
manifestations of host ideologies. Given that the influ-
ence of populist attitudes and attitudes towards the rad-
ical host ideologies appear to be largely separate from
each other, we find little in the way of interaction effects
that are consistent for both countries. Furthermore, the
selection of the somewhat dissimilar cases of Austria and
Germany provides us with a certain robustness and gen-
eralizability of our results. While this illustrates that pop-
ulism and host ideologies are independent and separate
concepts, it also highlights the need to examine the ef-
fects of populism in light of the ideological attitudes to
which populism is connected to avoid under- or overesti-
mating any effects. More importantly, this study under-
lines the need to design democratic reforms and adopt
measures that specifically and separately aim tomitigate
populism and radical host ideologies.
Our findings thus have important implications for dis-
entangling the relationship between populism, host ide-
ologies and democracy, and, thus for our understand-
ing of the threat populism poses to liberal and rep-
resentative democracy. In doing so, we make a gen-
uine contribution to the literature on the demand-side
of electoral politics as well as on democratic reforms.
Given some methodological limitations, however, we
need to point out some potential weaknesses that fur-
ther research should address. This primarily concerns
improved measurements of populist attitudes and atti-
tudes towards radical host ideologies as well as citizens’
understanding and their expectations from democratic
decision-making.
Further research should also focusmore on how pop-
ulism and attitudes based on radical host ideologies in-
teract and consider possible consequences of these in-
teractions. This refers in particular to possible effects on
electoral behavior, and especially on the relevance of cit-
izens’ notions of democracy. Based on our findings, fur-
ther research is needed on the notions of democracy
among certain groups of people, e.g., those holding left-
wing preferences on economic issues and authoritarian
preferences on socio-cultural issues (Lefkofridi, Wagner,
& Willmann, 2014), or those from lower socio-economic
strata (Stark, Wegscheider, Brähler, & Decker, 2017). In
addition to a better understanding of democratic discon-
tent, this research can help to promote democratic re-
forms that ensure the integration and participation of cit-
izens in the political process.
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